Georgia’s ‘Foreign Agents’ Law: Explained
ESI Team
Key Takeaways:
Georgia's 'Foreign Agents' law has sparked major controversy, triggering mass protests in Tbilisi and potential sanctions from the US and EU, driven by concerns over its impact on civil liberties and the freedoms of NGOs and media.
The law requires organisations receiving over 20% of their funding from abroad to register as foreign agents, a measure perceived as expanding government control and comparative to repressive Russian legislation.
Critics, including the EU and US, argue that the legislation mimics Russian laws designed to stifle dissent and media freedom, potentially jeopardising Georgia's EU membership ambitions and democratic progress.
Despite significant public opposition and a presidential veto, the Georgian Dream party's parliamentary majority ensured the bill's passage, reflecting a potential shift away from European integration towards a more Russia-aligned stance.
Overview
The introduction of the so-called ‘Foreign Agents’ law in Georgia has sparked significant controversy, leading to large protests in Tbilisi and punitive measures such as sanctions from the US and likely EU accession rejection. The bill, passed by the country’s ruling Georgia Dream party, mandates that organisations receiving over 20% of their funding from abroad, such as Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and media outlets, register as foreign agents "bearing the interests of a foreign power", subjecting them to strict disclosure requirements and penalties. The EU and US consider this legislation reductive, arguing that it threatens civil liberties by increasing government power to suppress dissent and limit NGO and media freedoms. Many have drawn concerning parallels to a repressive Russian law, while others have noted the hypocrisy of such criticism given the existence of similar laws in the EU and the US.
The bill is nearly identical to one that the Georgian Dream party attempted to pass last year but rescinded due to similar street protests. The recent protests saw thousands of Georgians clashing with riot police and attempting to storm the parliament in Tbilisi. Georgia’s president, Salome Zourabichvili, vetoed the law, raising concerns about its impact on civil liberties and Georgia's path to EU membership. Despite this, her protest was largely symbolic, and the Georgian Dream party used their parliamentary majority to overturn the veto on May 28th. With the law expected to come into force in the coming months, it is crucial to understand how this legislation will position Georgia between Russian and European influence and its broader implications for the region.
EU Interference in Georgia?
With candidate status granted in December 2023, Georgian’s have made their desire to join the EU pertinently clear, with as much as 79% of the country’s population hoping to join the economic and political union. Unlike existing EU members, Georgia is not typically featured on European maps, situated on the eastern banks of the Black Sea and extending into the Caucasus Mountains. However, Georgia's links to Europe date back to its role on the ancient Silk Road and early adoption of Christianity. Throughout history, medieval alliances, Renaissance influences, and modern political aspirations have continually tied Georgia to European culture and governance. Its recent history as an independent state began in 1991, having been part of the Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union since the early 1800s. This long history of foreign domination, a reminder of which came when Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, partly explains Georgia's desire to connect with Western European neighbours to consolidate its political and economic autonomy. EU membership would boost Georgia's economy through increased trade and investment, while also enhancing political stability and democratic legitimacy. Through the Eastern Partnership initiative, which seeks to bolster European democratic values and cooperation with post-Soviet states in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, the EU has already established significant trade ties with Georgia. This is evident in the signing of Association and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements with the country, alongside other Eastern Partnership members like Ukraine and Moldova. While Georgian aspirations for EU membership are clear, the EU's intentions with Georgia are less transparent.
For the EU, Georgia is of significant strategic importance, providing a gateway to Central Asian trade and energy exports. Serving as a key transit route, Georgia hosts pipelines such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and the South Caucasus Pipeline, which facilitate the transportation of natural gas and oil from the Caspian Sea region to Europe, bypassing Russia and enhancing European energy security. Similarly, the Eastern Partnership and TRACECA program aim to bolster connectivity, trade, and economic development in the region, providing advantageous opportunities for the EU. Through these avenues, Georgia's role as a link between Europe and Central Asia enhances the EU's trade prospects and economic integration in the broader region. As result, political stability in Georgia is of particular importance for the EU. In practice, this means mitigating the risk of subversive influence and disruption to critical infrastructure by Georgia’s northern neighbour, Russia. One such method for the promotion of stability is the support of NGOs, media outlets and political advocacy groups which share the values and interests of the EU. Under the ensuing bill, these organisations would likely be labelled ‘Foreign Agents’, a label which evokes the image of a malicious foreign actor in the consciousness of the public. For this reason, it is clear to see the EU’s concern and opposition to the bill, which they believe will reduce Western influence in favour of Russian influence in Georgia. At present, the EU has yet to make a formal decision on its response to the law, suggesting that its implementation will “negatively impact Georgia’s EU path”, whilst urging Georgian leadership to change course and reverse the law.
Russian Interference in Georgia?
With images of Georgian riot police in dark civilian clothing beating protestors waving EU flags, many were quick to draw comparisons to the 2014 Maidan protests in Ukraine, which preceded hostilities and subsequent war in the Donbas region. In Georgia, the ruling Georgia Dream party seems to have u-turned from the pursuit of EU membership, instead opting to pursue legislation that has been described by the EU as “incompatible with EU values and standards”, whilst markedly similar to legislation enacted in Russia. The notion of Russian influence in the adoption of this legislation is not helped by the seemingly pro-Russian views held by the Georgian Dream leadership. Bidzina Ivanishvili, Chairman of the Georgian Dream party, who made his billions in metals and banking in Russia, claimed that a 'global war party' has been using Georgia as a pawn in its proxy conflict with Russia and pushing the countries closer to war. Such views, frequently espoused by Russian politicians, are also echoed by the Georgian Dream party. This has resulted in a substantial majority in the Georgian parliament showing Russian sympathies, potentially steering the country away from NATO and European integration. This influence has previously been alluded to by opposition political figures, most notably the Georgian President, Salome Zourabichvili, who in February expressed concern of Russian influence and interference over the upcoming parliamentary elections through cyber-attacks and propaganda.
While these clandestine accusations remain unproven, Russian influence within Georgia is a persistent national vulnerability. It's crucial to acknowledge Russian influence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, comprising about 20% of Georgia's landmass, achieved through military presence and political sway since the Russo-Georgian war of 2008. These areas hold strategic significance for Russia, granting access to the Caucasus and the Black Sea while acting as a buffer against NATO expansion. Furthermore, they empower Russia to manipulate Georgia's internal and external affairs, shaping its geopolitical stance and hindering its ties with Western bodies such as NATO and the European Union. Approximately 20 Russia-leaning parties, public organisations, and media outlets are known to operate in Georgia, potentially providing the impetus to push forward with this legislation. Russia has become a key trading partner for Georgia, as it has not participated in Western sanctions. In the last two years, around 25,333 Russian companies have registered in Georgia, leading to accusations that Georgian figures are facilitating the circumvention of EU sanctions for Russian individuals. Russia may view this bill as a crucial step toward fostering a similar governmental relationship to that which they have with Belarus. This would provide Russia with an ally strategically positioned at the gateway to the Caucasus and the Middle East.
Preservation of Georgian Sovereignty?
Whilst recent protests in Tbilisi seemed to confirm Georgia's desire to align with Europe and the West, the Georgia Dream party presents a genuine argument that it represents a form of populist thought thriving in Europe, having initially established itself on an anti-neoliberal platform. This brand of populism rejects multinational liberal values, preferring traditional values, free from the interference of what they perceive to be ‘globalist’ entities. 86% of the Georgian population is Eastern Orthodox Christian, a statistic which undoubtedly influenced the election of the Georgian Dream party in 2020 with a majority of 90 MPs. Whilst fiscally centre-left, Georgian Dream campaigned on a socially conservative platform, aiming to preserve Georgian traditions and religious culture as opposed to submitting to the liberal behemoth of the EU. This 'silent majority' of voters, while not explicitly pro-Russian, may simply prefer to avoid foreign involvement that could alter Georgian politics and cultural norms. In today's polarised world, many quickly judge a country as pro- or anti-Russian based on its willingness to comply with Western powers' demands.
Whilst the US National Democratic Institute (NDI) polls in 2023 stated that 79% of the Georgian population wanted to be part of the EU, there has been a decline in the number of Georgians advocating for an exclusively pro-Western foreign policy. The survey revealed that initially, 47% of Georgians supported the idea of strictly pro-Western foreign policy. However, in the latest survey conducted in 2023, only 37% of Georgians expressed this viewpoint. Like Australia’s seemingly contradictory trade relationship with regional rival China, many Georgians feel that a neighbour such as Russia should not be ignored for fear of losing trade benefits. Seen through this lens, the 'Foreign Agents' bill sheds its broader geopolitical implications and is perceived as a purely domestic choice made by a socially conservative government to uphold the societal norms embraced by many Georgians.
Outlook
In the short term, Brussels will stress that the passage of this law undermines Georgia's journey toward EU membership, leading to the suspension of all accession talks and hindering progress in European integration. The EU might also levy penalties or sanctions against Georgian officials backing the bill, mirroring actions taken by the US, such as visa bans and potential sanctions targeting Georgian Dream politicians and their families. Additionally, the EU, along with other Western states, is anticipated to escalate diplomatic pressure and re-evaluate their cooperation and financial assistance to Georgia. This re-evaluation will underscore the importance of Georgia adhering to democratic standards and human rights norms to maintain its path toward European integration.
In the medium term, the influence of Western states and institutions in Georgia is expected to decline as NGOs and media outlets encounter more stringent restrictions and scrutiny regarding their funding and activities. Moreover, the enactment of this law heightens the probability of political persecution and media suppression, as bureaucratic obstacles are likely to obstruct dissenters and media critics. The result of elections in October will provide a key indicator for the Georgian electorates support for Georgian Dream and the bill.
In the long term, the erosion of Western influence in Georgia is likely, as tighter regulations on NGOs and media outlets diminish their impact. This could create opportunities for alternative alliances, potentially leading to a closer alignment with Russia's interests. Consequently, there may be a shift in the balance of power in the region, impacting broader geopolitical dynamics. Additionally, the entrenchment of these restrictions may result in a decline in democratic standards and human rights norms. Rebuilding trust with the EU and other Western states will be essential for Georgia's future integration efforts.