Things to Watch - 2024
Welcome to the first edition of ESI’s ‘Things to Watch’. With 2024 well underway, expect widespread elections to shake up regional politics, technological developments in AI changing the way you work and further shifts in the balance of global power. 2024 has already been dubbed by some as the ‘year of chaos’. For this reason, our team of research analysts have delved into the key global developments and trends that they believe will shape the year ahead.
Artificial Intelligence in 2024 - Ben Goddard
The role of AI in our lives remains a topic that evokes confusion and anxiety among a significant portion of the global population. Much of this anxiety stems from AI's potential to disrupt the labour market, particularly in industries reliant on repetitive tasks. Sectors such as manufacturing, logistics, and transportation have already experienced notable advancements through robotic assembly, automated delivery packing, and the prospect of self-driving vehicles. Additionally, white-collar occupations, particularly in IT and finance, are witnessing the efficiency and precision AI technology offers in administrative and data-driven work. While businesses stand to benefit from AI implementation in these sectors, limitations in autonomous AI use suggest that mass worker replacement is improbable in the near future. Instead, 2024 will witness the introduction of 'AI co-pilots' in numerous roles—chatbots serving as virtual assistants to enhance employee productivity and efficiency. For instance, in January, Deloitte introduced a trial version of its generative AI chatbot designed to aid in the creation of emails and PowerPoints.
This year will see over 70 elections around the world, giving rise to significant disruption and influence from AI generated deepfakes and disinformation. This influence has already surfaced ahead of the recent elections in Bangladesh on January 7th, where deepfake videos portrayed opposition leaders and news anchors making inflammatory statements on divisive topics such as the Gaza conflict. The prevalence of such disinformation will intensify as the year progresses, with pivotal leadership decisions being made in countries like India, Taiwan, and the UK, culminating with the US presidential election in November. Malicious actors are increasingly empowered by advancements in generative AI, facilitating the cost-effective production of deceptive content to influence opinion on conflicts, politics and wider social issues. Despite efforts by social media platforms and governments to curb its impact, the pervasive nature of disinformation coupled with limited resources makes complete prevention nearly impossible. Consequently, the responsibility for fact-checking and critical assessment falls heavily on the general populace, posing significant challenges to the democratic process and objective decision-making.
BRICS 2024 - Ryan Shaban
As 2023 drew to a close, events in the United Nations General Assembly embodied the trajectory of multipolarity playing out on the global stage. An emergency session, convened for the first time since 1997, saw a resolution for a humanitarian truce in Gaza adopted with 153 votes in favour. The United States and nine other countries voted against. Stark differences in political stances between the Global North and South are predicted to grow further in 2024, as the Western position increasingly appears the outlier. Fervent Western support for Ukraine during the Russo-Ukrainian War contrasts with neutrality in much of the Global South. Many countries in the Middle East, South America, and Africa echoed opposition to Israel's actions in Gaza since October 2023, while the West maintains support for Israel. In a turbulent international order, 2024 promises to bring about a new brand of multipolar global politics.
A manifestation of growing multipolarity, the BRICS organisation enters 2024 with five additional members, amid intentions to expand its membership further. A key feature of BRICS policy is de-dollarisation: to detach the Global South from the US dollar’s influence as global reserve currency. While a new BRICS currency is highly unlikely to be realised, BRICS-influenced trade regimes could be critical to de-dollarisation. The policy represents a growing challenge to economic norms in the pursuit of economic multipolarity. With BRICS superseding the G7 in population and percentage of the global economy represented, 2024 will be defining both in terms of BRICS policy towards the West and in the Western response. The diversification of the G20 has already begun with the admission of the African Union. The high likelihood of continued expansion of both BRICS and the G20 indicates an increasingly perilous rivalry. The degree of friction will largely be defined by the US position, as isolationists and internationalists jostle for power in the November election.
A European NATO in 2024? - Alex Vile
US politicians have consistently aimed to foster a NATO alliance in Europe that benefits both the United States and European interests, though this alliance should not rely solely on the excessive defence spending of the United States. Both the Obama and Bush administrations complained of Europe's reluctance to meet the NATO requirement of allocating 2% of their GDP for defence spending. Obama made this explicit, stating that ‘Europe has been complacent about its own defence’. Yet it was the presidency of Donald Trump that made US discontent with the NATO member states apparent. Prior to his election in 2016, Trump had labelled NATO obsolete. Although he later retracted this statement after a meeting with the NATO Secretary General, his criticisms of NATO spending persisted. This was in line with his commitment to protectionist financial policies.
Despite US criticism, European NATO members serve as a crucial point of defence for the US; spearheading the deterrent to Russian aggression, whilst allowing the US to disperse its resources to other areas of contention like Taiwan and Israel. With the growing possibility of a Trump re-election in November, the Biden administration will likely double down on its commitment to assist its partners in the Middle East and Asia. European NATO members on the other hand will be considering the prospect of reduced US support in the Ukraine conflict. Military spending in the EU hit a record EUR 240 billion in 2022 – a figure which will be difficult to beat in 2024 due to diminishing optimism in Ukraine’s ability to expel Russian forces alongside a looming recession in Europe. Despite this, Finland notably acceded to NATO in April 2023, whilst Sweden is likely to accede in the first half of 2024, pending Turkey’s acceptance, marking the coalition’s first new members since Estonia in 2004. Whilst NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has had his term extended to October 2024, there remains considerable uncertainty as to his successor. This successor must be prepared for the potential outcome of commanding NATO without the historic paternal support of the United States, ushering a new era of European self-reliance.
A Year of Elections - Adam Mutaf
The shifting balance of global power will become more evident as voters in 64 countries, representing over half of the global population, prepare to cast their vote in 2024. Votes will be cast in a global environment marked by persistent economic difficulty, surging migration and disruptions to global supply chains, posing a significant obstacle for incumbent centrist parties struggling to address these issues. This is pertinent in many European national elections, with potential to also impact upcoming EU legislative elections, and concerns about far-right parties like Austria's FPO and Belgium's VB aligning with a nationalist-populist trend. Success for these parties could shape EU treaty reform, influencing migration and environmental policies. While Ursula Von der Leyen is expected to run again, there are suspicions that Charles Michel may step down in favour of Viktor Orban if no successor is elected.
The prospect of a Trump or Republican electoral victory in November threatens the West’s unified policy on Ukraine and Russia through a reduction of financial and military aid to Kyiv. The potential reinstatement of a 10% trading tariff on EU exports could also exacerbate divisions within NATO and the broader Western political hemisphere as we know it. Domestically, lingering memory of the Capitol riots in 2020 raise doubts about the legitimacy of US institutions and the feasibility of overcoming partisan differences in American society.
In 2024, the world faces a critical historical moment. Global freedom has now declined for the 17th consecutive year as democracies implement measures on freedom of expression to curb hate speech, disinformation, and extremism. Iran's election disqualified over 25% of its opposition candidates, leading citizens to boycott elections in March. India's Modi faces his most challenging election yet, battling against a coalition of 28 parties. The election of Lai Ching-Te in Taiwan not only carries profound implications for China's stance on an independent Taiwan but also serves as a litmus test for the United States' dedication to safeguarding a critical ally in the Asia-Pacific region. As the world stands at this crucial crossroads, individuals must decide between continuing the trajectory of the past three decades, marked by globalisation, or shifting towards a path characterised by isolationism, hawkish foreign policy, and multipolar competition.
A Consolidation of Populism in Europe - Eduard Dragusin
In light of the major elections taking place across the world in 2024, it is imperative to reflect on the position of populism while the myriad of political parties contest an ever-more turbulent and anxious electorate. Since the 2009 global financial crisis, populism has re-emerged across Europe as a ‘promising answer’ to the many social and economic problems that have persisted throughout the 2010s and into the 2020s. The success of populist parties in European and American elections is no recent trend, but analysts and politicians feared the rise of populism, seeing it as a direct challenge to the status quo. The 2010s can accurately be described as the decade when populism gained prominence. This was evident with Donald Trump’s election in 2016, and Marine Le Pen’s popularity in recent French elections. Right-wing populist parties have also governed Poland and Hungary for most of the past decade.
It is clear, following the election of liberal Donald Tusk to govern Poland, that populism has seen its apogee over the past decade, with it now consolidating itself as a challenger to the status quo in European and American politics. With their rhetoric toned down, their media presence stabilised, and their leadership finally building a strong foundation, the European electorate is no longer looking at populists as outsiders, but rather as the norm in times of uncertainty. In 2024, we will see populists performing on par with their conservative, liberal, socialist, and centrist opponents. While populism will persist in upcoming elections, its impact will remain largely contingent on the unfavourable economic and social downturn Europe finds itself in. However, it consistently demonstrates in governance that populists, like their traditional counterparts, struggle to fulfil the multitude of promises made during the election process.
Central Asia Branching Out - Ben Goddard
The Central Asian 'Stan' states—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan—are geographically and historically linked to their northern neighbour, Russia. Situated in a challenging neighbourhood, they are surrounded by China to the east and Iran and Afghanistan to the south. The invasion of Ukraine, another former Soviet state, has highlighted the importance for the Stans to diversify their strategic relationships as a bulwark to exploitation by Moscow. 2023 saw the Stans look to China as a significant trade partner in the first China-Central Asia Summit, whilst welcoming summits and trade discussions with the US and EU; a trend which will continue throughout 2024. While Russia’s war has encouraged the Stans to increase their engagement with the West, they will inevitably continue to engage with Russia and facilitate its bypassing of Western sanctions. Kazakhstan in particular remains dependent on Russia to export the majority of its natural resources, a critical facet of its economy, and thus has been more open to facilitating parallel imports to Russia.
Elsewhere, Tajikistan is collaborating with China's Huawei for the development of telecommunications and internet infrastructure. Simultaneously, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are partnering with China to jointly address the growing challenge of water scarcity in Central Asia through cooperative water management strategies. Most significant for Central Asia will be the continued infrastructural development of a ‘Middle Corridor’, a feature of China’s slowing Belt and Road Initiative, establishing the region as a crossroads for Europe-China trade. These states are also settling into the reality that their southern neighbour, Afghanistan, is now under control of the Taliban; a development which they welcome. Trade and developmental infrastructure projects between Central Asian states and Afghanistan will increase in the ensuing year, spearheaded by Uzbekistan, as the Stans help the country to rebuild after decades of war, whilst attempting to stabilise regional security and deter jihadism.
A Chinese Invasion of Taiwan? - Tristan Langlade
With the third consecutive presidential victory of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) receiving over 40% of the votes, the Taiwanese electorate demonstrated their conviction to remain independent, rejecting Chinese influence. Vice President Lai Ching-Te will become president in May, inheriting the ever-growing threat of forceful reunification with China. The newly elected president, a strong advocate for independence, holds tougher views on the relationship with China than his predecessor, despite being from the same party. He promotes the strengthening of ties with fellow democracies and enhancing Taiwan's defence against Chinese threats, all while acknowledging the potential for economic sanctions and military challenges from China. China responded to the result by reaffirming the ‘One China’ principle, making mention of “separatist activities” in Taiwan and the illegitimacy of the elections which they say do not represent the “mainstream view on the island”.
China currently lacks the military capability to invade Taiwan successfully, given the island's natural fortress-like features, including mountains and challenging straits for navigation. Additionally, Xi Jinping has recently purged the units of the Chinese army tasked with missile launches, critical for an invasion, due to malfunctioning missiles. Recent surges in military enrolment also demonstrate the desire of the Taiwanese population to defend their island in the event of a Chinese invasion. Given these factors, it is unlikely that China will invade Taiwan in the coming year. This does not, however, negate the threat present in the minds of many Taiwanese, who see a near-term invasion as inevitable. In the meantime, China will continue to gain influence in Taiwan without resorting to violence, utilising propaganda and leveraging its connections within the pro-China Kuomintang political party. Xi Jinping’s obsession with Chinese “reunification” may push him to act irrationally and invade Taiwan for ideological reasons, despite the economic, diplomatic and political consequences. An accidental escalation caused by Chinese naval or aerial incursions by the Chinese air force should not be understated.
Despite Taiwan’s critical role in semiconductor production forming what is dubbed the ‘silicon shield’, the result of the US elections in November will be crucial to Taiwan's survival as a democracy and will shape Chinese decision-making in the succeeding year. Falling short of an invasion, the coming year will define the level to which the US is willing to support its strategic ally in Asia, whilst also establishing the efficacy of the silicon shield against creeping Chinese incursion.
Treacherous Waters - Eduard Dragusin
It seems like only yesterday that the ‘Ever-Given’ container ship blocked the Suez Canal for nearly a week in March 2021, forcing ships carrying almost USD 60 billion of trade to queue in the canal waiting to pass. The shipping delays caused prices of everyday goods and fuel to rise. In 2024, we face an even greater danger to global shipping in the treacherous waters of the Red Sea. With the Israel-Gaza conflict continuing into January, geopolitical tensions in the Middle East have risen to an unprecedented level. Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen and opportunistic pirates have been using the conflict as an impetus to conduct strikes and hijackings in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. These groups have posed a threat to international shipping through the Red Sea for several months, and this will continue throughout the coming year, with the potential to extend into 2025 if the conflict continues and military operations fail to achieve a reduction in attacks.
Houthi rebel attacks on vessels passing through the Red Sea have prompted another crisis for US and UK, whose militaries who have a duty to protect global trade and have recently engaged in joint operations against key Houthi actors. With this extremely busy shipping route under threat, the only viable alternative for container vessels is to circumnavigate the African continent, increasing journey times by up to 10 days and prices up to 300%. Commercial ships sailing the east coast of Africa continue to face heavily armed pirates attacking from skiffs, prompting many companies to employ armed guards to protect cargo, or reroute via safer waters. Both measures come at a significant cost to the shipping company and are reflected in inflated consumer prices. Rising tensions in Somalia will only exacerbate the threat of piracy following Ethiopia’s unilateral recognition of the breakaway state of Somaliland. Ongoing conflict in the region will catalyse a further exodus of refugees seeking safety and economic opportunity, whilst political discontent and lack of opportunity will beget a new generation of pirates, posing further risks to shipping and consequently global economic stability.